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SUPPRESSING THE INCRIMINATING
STATEMENTS OF FOREIGNERS
John Quigley*
INTRODUCTION
Foreign nationals arrested on a criminal charge enjoy a right, based on treaty,
of access to their home-state consul, and additionally, a right to be informed by
detaining authorities of that right.' In the United States, the police who arrest for-
eign nationals frequently proceed to interrogate them without explaining the right
of access to a consul. Non-compliance is frequent even when the charge is serious,
as in capital murder. A number of foreign nationals have been condemned to death
in the United States, following trials in which an incriminating statement figured
prominently as evidence, but where the statement was made before authorities gave
information about consular access.2
Attorneys representing foreign nationals have objected to the admissibility of
an incriminating statement made under such circumstances. These objections have
generated appellate opinions in both the state and federal courts, though to date, not
from the U.S. Supreme Court.
This Article assesses the manner in which the courts have handled such cases.
After explaining consular access and its purposes, the Article asks whether consular
access involves a judicially cognizable right, whether the information about con-
sular access must be provided prior to interrogating, and whether principles of
international law call for the suppression of a statement made by a foreign national
who was not informed about consular access. Next, the Article examines the deci-
sions of international courts on remedies where consular access obligations have
been violated. Finally, it examines the views on remedies given to U.S. courts by
the U.S. Department of State and, in particular, the Department's analysis of
decisions on this subject by the courts of other countries.
* President's Club Professor in Law, Ohio State University. LL.B. Harvard Law School,
1966; M.A. Harvard University, 1966. The author has been counsel to the Government of
Mexico in filing amicus curiae briefs in U.S. court cases on consular access. He testified as
an expert witness, called by the defense, in Commonwealth v. Malvo, Circuit Court of Fairfax
County, Virginia. He was Co-Petitioner before the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights in the Fierro case, cited herein. This Article was selected Law Review Article of the
Year by the American Branch of the International Association of Penal Law.
' Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 36, para. 1, 21 U.S.T.
77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
2 Exparte Fierro, 934 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1122
(1997).
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I. THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS AND SUPPRESSION
The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations ("VCCR") protects a foreign
national arrested on a criminal charge.' Article 36, paragraph 1, requires detaining
authorities to inform a foreign national of her or his right to access a consul of her
or his home state.4 If the foreign national opts for such access, the authorities must
facilitatesuch access.' The United States is among the 165 states that are parties to
the VCCR.s
Additionally, the VCCR requires states to provide a remedy if the obligation is
violated. Article 36, paragraph 2, states:
The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be
exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the
receiving State, subject to the proviso, however, that the said
laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the
purposes for which the rights accorded under this Article are
intended.7
Not infrequently, police in the United States fail to inform a foreign national
upon arrest of the right of consular access, but interrogate and elicit an incriminat-
ing statement. While no scientific studies have been conducted, it is thought that
foreign nationals are particularly prone to succumbing to interrogation techniques
aimed at encouraging them to confess. A Paraguayan national, operating on his
understanding either of Roman Catholicism or of the Paraguayan legal system,
apparently thought that if he confessed to the murder with which he was charged,
mercy would be shown him. Instead he was convicted and executed.9 A Mexican
national who confessed to murder later explained that his Mexican colleagues, who
may have been the actual perpetrators, asked him to confess because he was
younger than they were and had no family obligations, and because they told him
See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 1, at art. 36, para. 1.
4 Id.
5 id.
6 2003 Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.E/22, available at www.un.org.
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 1, at para. 2.
8 Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (per curiamn) (denying a stay of execution).
9Id.
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that if he confessed he would be deported to Mexico rather than arrested.'" The
colleagues fled to Mexico and the young man was convicted of the murder."
Foreign nationals may have particular difficulty understanding the right to
remain silent when it is explained to them by a police officer. They may not
understand that it applies at a police station, because police may immediately
proceed to ask questions about the suspected offense. Whether or not foreign
nationals in general, or a particular foreign national, are peculiarly likely to make
incriminating statements, or are peculiarly likely to misunderstand the right to
silence, the VCCR assumes that foreign nationals may benefit from consular
assistance and requires the detaining authorities to facilitate this assistance.
The issue of whether suppression is appropriate depends on three subsidiary
issues. First, it must appear that consular access is a right that adheres to the
foreign national. Second, it must appear that information about consular access
must be provided prior to interrogation. Third, it must appear that ajudicial remedy
is required.
If. CONSULAR ACCESS AS A RIGHT
The U.S. Department of State told the courts that the right of consular access
relates to the two states involved - the receiving state and the sending state - but
not to the detainee. 2 "The right of an individual to communicate with his consular
officials is derivative of the sending state's right to extend consular protection to
its nationals," it said, and therefore the VCCR does not establish "rights of
individuals."' 3 The Department focused on language in the VCCR preamble that,
it said, negated consular access as a right of the individual. 4 The preamble phrase
read, "[r]ealizing that the purpose of such privileges and immunities is not to
benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient performance of the functions by
consular posts on behalf of their respective States."' 5
Appearing before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 1998, the
Department said, in a written submission, that "[t]he purpose of the VCCR is not
to establish or protect individual human rights," and it cited the preamble language
10 Memorandum in Support of Jurisdiction of Appellant State of Ohio at 6-7, State v.
Ramirez, 724 N.E.2d 814 (Ohio 2000) (on file with author).
" State v. Ramirez, 732 N.E.2d 1065 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) (reversing for inadequacy of
Miranda warnings).
12 Letter from David Andrews, Legal Adviser, Department of State, to James K.
Robinson, Assistant Attorney General A-3 (Oct. 15, 1999) [hereinafter Andrews Letter]
(including as Attachment A, Department of State Answers to the Questions Posed by the
First Circuit in United States v. Nai Fook Li).
13 Id.
14 Id. at A-4.
5 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 1, at pmbl. (emphasis omitted).
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in support. 16 The court rejected the argument, saying that the language referred to
consular officers and was aimed at highlighting the functional character of the
privileges accorded them. 7
The Solicitor-General of the United States, also citing the preamble language,
told the U.S. Supreme Court that consular access is not a right that adheres to a
detained foreign national.'" The interpretation of the preamble language by the
Department and by the Solicitor-General is inconsistent with prior Executive
Branch use of the same language. The bulk of the VCCR deals with the powers and
immunities of consular officers. The immunities are aimed not at advantaging them
as individuals, but at allowing the states they serve to perform consular functions.
This preamble phrase, moreover, was taken nearly verbatim from a sister treaty,
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which had been drafted just two
years earlier.' 9 Whereas the VCCR deals with consular officers, the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations deals with diplomatic officers.2 °
The phrase, as used in the two conventions, was boiler-plate language to explain
immunities adhering to the representatives of a state. The U.S. delegation to the
Vienna conference at which the VCCR was drafted, headed by a deputy legal
advisor to the Secretary of State, recited this origin of the preamble language in
explaining the VCCR.2' The delegation sent a detailed report that was transmitted
by the Secretary of State to the United States Senate.22 In its account of the
preamble, the U.S. delegation referred to it as applying to "officers, members of
families, and employees. 23 Moreover, arguing the Tehran Hostages case, the
Department of State wrote, "Article 36 establishes rights not only for the consular
officer but, perhaps even more importantly, for the nationals of the sending State
16 Written Observations of the United States of America, Request for Advisory Opinion
OC-16 (June 1, 1998), at 26-27 (on file with Inter-American Court of Human Rights).
'7 The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees
of the Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99 of 1 Oct. 1999, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
ser. A/16 para. 74 (1999) [hereinafter The Right to Information].
IS Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 19 n.3, 37, Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S.
371 (1998) (No. 97-8214).
'9 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500
U.N.T.S. 95.
20 Id. (The preamble to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations reads: "Realizing
that the purpose of such privileges and immunities is not to benefit individuals but to ensure
the efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic missions as representing States.").
21 Report of the United States Delegation to the United Nations Conference on Consular
Relations, Vienna, Austria, March 4 to April 22, 1963, in Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations with Optional Protocol, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., Executive E (U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington 1969) at 41, 46.
22 Id. at41.
23 Id. at 46.
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who are assured access to consular officers and through them to others."'24 The
Department based that suit against Iran on the proposition that by taking consuls
hostage, Iran deprived U.S. nationals of access to the consuls.25 U.S. nationals had
a right of access, and if the consuls were sequestered, that right was violated.26
For this reasoning to be valid, the preamble could not be read to negate rights to
nationals in need of consular assistance.
Several U.S. courts have accepted interpretation of the preamble by the
Department and the Solicitor-General to conclude that Article 36 gives no
enforceable right to a detained foreign national.2 ' The weakness of that inter-
pretation was understood by dissenting Judge Torruella in United States v. Li.2
Judge Torruella, viewing the matter as had the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, wrote:
It is clear that in the context in which [the preamble language] is
framed (e.g., "such privileges and immunities"), it refers to the privileges
and immunities of "diplomatic agents" qua diplomatic agents, and not
with respect to the individual rights established in Article 36(1)(b) for
the benefit of detained nationals.29
I1. THE MEANING OF "WITHOUT DELAY"
In a Virginia case, police attempted to comply with the Article 36 obligation
thirty-six hours after arresting a foreign national.3° However, during that interval
they elicited an incriminating statement. 3' The defense attorney moved to suppress
the statement, but the trial court refused.32 The Supreme Court of Virginia stated
that "[t]he provisions of Article 36 do not mandate immediate notification, nor do
24 Memorial of the Government of the United States of America, United States
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. Pleadings 174.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 See, e.g., United States v. De La Pava, 268 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that the
preamble supports the view that the Convention created no judicially enforceable individual
rights); State v. Martinez-Rodriguez, 33 P.3d 267, 273-74 (N.M. 2001) (relying in part on
the proposition that the preamble states that a purpose of the treaty is "not to benefit
individuals but to ensure the efficient performance of functions by consular posts" and citing
the Department of State for the proposition that "[tihe [only] remedies for failures of consular
notification... are diplomatic, political, or exists between states under international law").
28 206 F.3d 56,68 (1st Cir.) (Torruella, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 956 (2000).
29 Id. at 72.
30 Bell v. Virginia, 563 S.E.2d 695 (Va. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1123 (2003).
32 Id. at 705.32 id.
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they necessarily require consular notification before an arrestee is advised of
Miranda rights and agrees to waive those rights by answering questions."33
Contrary to that of the Virginia Supreme Court is the view of the Department
of Justice in Li.'4 In oral argument before the U.S. Court of Appeals, an assistant
U.S. Attorney was asked, "Does [the Vienna Convention] require that the individual
be notified immediately?"'3 The attorney replied, "Well, yes it does."36
Light is shed on the meaning of "without delay" by the manner in which the
phrase was drafted. The International Law Commission, which produced the first
draft of what became the VCCR, had written the words "without undue delay."37
The draft was revised, however, at the Vienna conference of states that finalized
the text of the convention. The conference formed two committees, and divided
between them the commission's draft articles. Article 36 went to the Second
Committee. There the United Kingdom took issue with the word "undue. 38
Concerned that the detaining authorities might contrive reasons to avoid consular
access, it proposed deleting the term.39 The Second Committee did so and sent
Article 36 to the plenary conference with the phrase reading "without delay."'
At the plenary conference, the Soviet delegate bemoaned the deletion because,
he said, it would give a right to consular access as soon as detention began:
[The deletion of "undue"] seemed to imply an obligation to
supply the information immediately, but when a national of the
sending State was committed to prison because he had com-
mitted an offence the authorities of the receiving State must
have time to collect the necessary documents with a view to
informing the consul."n
The Soviet delegate's view that "without delay" meant "immediate" was not
challenged by any other delegate. Those delegates favoring the deletion of "undue"
might have tried to mollify the opposition by saying that the deletion did not mean
31 Id. at 706.
3 See generally Li, 206 F.3d 56.
3 Id. at 69 (quoting Oral Argument of Apr. 6, 1999).
3 Id. (quoting Oral Argument of Apr. 6, 1999).
37 Summary Records of the 13th Session, [1961] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 242, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1961.
38 United Kingdom: Amendments to Article 36, U.N. Doc., A/CONF.25/C.2/L.107, in
2 Official Records: U.N. Conference on Consular Relations 85, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.25/16/Add.1 (1963).
9 See id.
4 See id. at 131.
41 1 Official Records: U.N. Conference on Consular Relations 37, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.25/16 (1963) (Mr. Konzhukov, U.S.S.R.).
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that consular access would apply as soon as detention began. They did not. The
evident view, among those states both opposing and favoring the deletion of
"undue," was that the phrase "without delay" meant immediate consular access,
with immediate notification to the detainee.
West Germany was one of the countries that, along with the U.S.S.R., thought
that the detaining authorities should have a period of time into a detention before
having to provide consular access.42 It took the approach of proposing a specific
grace period.43 In the conference's committee, it offered an amendment to give
the authorities thirty days before allowing consular access." By this amendment,
the "without undue delay" language would have been retained, but qualified by
the words "but at the latest within one month."'45 When discussion in the com-
mittee made it clear that other states were not willing to allow so long a period,
West Germany revised its own amendment to change "thirty days" to "48 hours."'46
Thus, in the amendment's revised form, states would have had a forty-eight-hour
grace period.
In this revised form, the Second Committee put the amendment to a vote and
rejected it.47 The rejection of a forty-eight-hour grace period, taken together with
the deletion of "undue," shows that the understanding of the states was that
"without delay" meant no delay, and therefore that consular access applied as soon
as detention commenced.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights referred to the principle that treaty
provisions be construed in keeping with their purpose and said that the phrase
"without delay" must be read in accordance with the purpose of notification,
namely, to ensure that the right to consular access is implemented.4" Therefore, it
concluded:
[T]he expression 'without delay' in Article 36(1)(b) of the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations means that the State
must comply with its duty to inform the detainee of the rights
that article confers upon him, at the time of his arrest or at least
before he makes his first statement before the authorities.49
42 See Federal Republic of Germany: Amendments to Article 36, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.25/C.2/L.74, in 2 Official Records: U.N. Conference on Consular Relations 81,
U.N. Doc. AICONF.25/16/Add.1 (1963).
43 id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 See 2 Official Records: U.N. Conference on Consular Relations 131, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.25/1 6/Add. 1 (1963).
47 id.
48 See The Right to Information, supra note 17, at para. 103.
41 Id. at para. 141(3).
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In Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.)5"
the International Court of Justice considered the meaning of "without delay" in
light of the fact that the arresting authorities may not immediately know that a
detainee is a foreign national. The court stated that in the drafting history of the
phrase "without delay" there was no mention by delegates of a:
connection with the issue of interrogation. The Court considers
that the provision in Article 36, paragraph l(b), that the receiv-
ing State authorities "shall inform the person concerned without
delay of his rights" cannot be interpreted to signify that the
provision of such information must necessarily precede any
interrogation, so that the commencement of interrogation before
the information is given would be a breach of Article 36."'
That caveat was required by the court's concern that the authorities may not initially
know that a detainee is a foreigner.
The court stated that information about consular access must be given "as soon
as it is realized that the person is a foreign national, or once there are grounds to
think that the person is probably a foreign national.""2 For that reason, the court
noted that the duty to inform "is not to be understood as necessarily meaning
'immediately upon arrest."' 53 At the same time, the court wrote that the detaining
authorities may not ignore the possibility that a detainee is a foreign national.54
They must make inquiry at the time of arrest.5
The International Court of Justice stated that the drafting history showed no
difference in the meaning of the phrase "without delay" in its several appearances
in Article 36.56 The term is also used in Article 36 to refer to notification to a
consul upon request by the detainee. Thus, in the court's reading of Article 36, both
the provision of information to the detainee and, upon a detainee's request, the
provision of information to a consul must occur "without delay."
50 2004 I.C.J. 128 (Mar. 31), available at http://www.icj-cij.org.
51 Id. at para. 87.
52 Id. at para. 88.
53 id.
' See id. at para. 64.
55 Id.
56 Id. at para. 86.
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IV. A JUDICIAL REMEDY
In United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga,"7 the U.S. Court of Appeals wrote
that "the Vienna Convention is silent - and therefore ambiguous, at best - on
whether or not suppression is an appropriate remedy.""8 U.S. courts have typically
said that suppression is not required when a foreign national is interrogated without
having been advised of the right of consular access. 9
The Department of State has taken the position that no judicial remedy,
suppression or any other, is required when the authorities have failed to advise
a foreign national about consular access.6° In 1998, Paraguay sued the United
States in the International Court of Justice when Virginia was about to execute a
Paraguayan national.6" The case involved no issue of an incriminating statement.62
The remedy sought by Paraguay was annulment of the conviction and sentence of
death.63 The Department of State, representing the United States in the litigation,
conceded that the United States had violated Article 36 by failing to inform the
Paraguayan about consular access.64
However, the Department told the court:
Paraguay's application maintains that the necessary legal con-
sequence for any such breach is that the ensuing conviction and
sentence must be put aside. There is absolutely no support for
this claim in the language of the Convention. The Court should
57 206 F.3d 882 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 991 (2000).
58 Id. at 887.
'9 See, e.g., United States v. Felix-Felix, 275 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating that
suppression of a statement is not a proper remedy for an Article 36 violation); United States
v. Cowo, 22 Fed. Appx. 25 (1st Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 966 (2002) (stating that
neither suppression of an incriminating statement nor dismissal of an indictment is an
appropriate remedy); United States v. Carrillo, 269 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
535 U.S. 1004 (2002) (stating that suppression of a statement is not a proper remedy); United
States v. Minjares-Alvarez, 264 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2001) (stating, "suppression is not
an appropriate remedy for a violation of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention," that nothing
in VCCR's text requires suppression as a remedy); Lopez v. Georgia, 558 S.E.2d 698, 700
(Ga. 2002) (stating, "nothing in [VCCR's] text requires the suppression of evidence," that
by its terms it does not require application of the exclusionary rule, and such a judicially-
created remedy cannot be imposed absent a violation of a constitutional right; any rights
created by the VCCR do not rise to the level of a constitutional right); State v. Issa, 752
N.E.2d 904 (Ohio 2001) (stating that a treaty-based right is on par with a statutory right, and
that the exclusionary rule is only used for constitutional violations).
60 See infra text accompanying note 65.
61 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 99 (Apr. 9).
62 id.
63 Id. (application of Paraguay, Apr. 3, 1998).
I id. (hearing of Apr. 7, 1998).
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not read into a clear and nearly universal multilateral instrument
such a substantial and potentially disruptive additional obliga-
tion that has no support in the language agreed by the parties.65
The second paragraph acknowledges that Article 36 issues will be handled in
the context of procedures provided by domestic law.' At the same time, the para-
graph requires that those procedures be applied in such a way as to implement the
Article 36 right.67
The second paragraph of Article 36 is directed at courts, even though courts are
not explicitly mentioned.68 The states signatory to the VCCR intended that courts
should implement the right identified in the first paragraph. This provision is
quite unusual in treaties. Very few, when they provide rights for individuals,
additionally state that it is incumbent on domestic courts to implement those
rights. The latter proposition, as in the Spain-U.S. treaty relating to Florida, is left
unsaid, and even in that situation, courts of the United States have found it their
obligation to provide implementation.69
The interchange among the states that adopted the text of paragraph 2 shows
that it requires a judicial remedy for a violation of paragraph 1. In the Second
Committee, the U.K. proposed language to strengthen the requirement that the
treaty prevail over domestic law.70 In place of International Law Commission
draft language that domestic legislation would prevail unless it "nullified" con-
sular access, the U.K. proposed the following language: "subject to the proviso,
however, that the said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the
purposes for which the rights accorded under this article are intended."71 The
Second Committee adopted the U.K. amendment, and that language appears in the
final text of paragraph 2.72
Nonetheless, when the text as approved by the Second Committee went to the
plenary session, the U.S.S.R. and other bloc states tried to reinstate the International
Law Commission's language. The Soviet delegate proposed that paragraph 2 read:
'The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be exercised in conformity
65 Id.
6 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 1, at art. 36, para. 2.
67 id.
68 Id.
69 United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 88-89 (1833).
70 See United Kingdom: Amendments to Article 36, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.25/C.2/L. 107,
in 2 Official Records: United Nations Conference on Consular Relations 85, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.25/16/Add.1 (1963).
71 Id.
72 See 1 Official Records: United Nations Conference on Consular Relations 348, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.25/16 (1963).
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with the laws and regulations of the receiving State, subject to the proviso, however,
that the said laws and regulations must not nullify these rights."73
The objection of the bloc states was that the U.K.'s language too clearly
required domestic courts to provide a remedy, altering, if necessary, domestic law
to achieve that end.74 The Soviet delegate said, in reference to paragraph 2, "that
the matters dealt with in article 36 were connected with the criminal law and
procedure of the receiving State, which were outside the scope of the codifica-
tion of consular law."75 The Belorussian delegate argued that "[t]he Conference
was drafting a consular convention, not an international penal code, and it had no
right to attempt to dictate the penal codes of sovereign States. 76 The Romanian
delegate said that Romania "could not agree to the inclusion in the convention of
any provision that would affect criminal procedure.
7
The U.K. language to which the bloc states were objecting is, to repeat, the
language that appears in paragraph 2 as finally adopted. The states that favored the
U.K. version did not dispute the Soviet-bloc interpretation that paragraph 2 required
courts of the receiving state to provide remedies, even if domestic law was
overridden in the process. Had they been of the opinion that paragraph 2 did not
require a judicial remedy, these states would likely have said so, as the Western
states were keen to encourage the bloc states to support the VCCR.
The VCCR is unusual in providing for a remedy. Most treaties only provide
obligations. U.S. courts provide remedies nonetheless. One example is United
States v. Rauscher,78 a case involving a U.S.-U.K. treaty that provided for the
extradition of persons sought on a charge of murder.79 At U.S. request, the U.K.
extradited Rauscher to the United States to stand trial for murder."0 After Rauscher
arrived, prosecutors filed an additional criminal charge against him.8 ' By a
principle of extradition law, called the rule of specialty, the requesting state may try
only for the offense on which extradition was sought.8 2 That principle was not
mentioned in the U.S.-U.K. treaty. 3 Nor did the treaty say anything about remedies
" Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Amendment to Article 36 of the Draft Convention,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.251L.34, in 2 Official Records: United Nations Conference on Consular
Relations 168, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.25/16/Add.1 (1963).
14 1 Official Records: United Nations Conference on Consular Relations 40, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.25/16 (1963) (Mr. Khlestov, U.S.S.R.).
75 id.
76 Id. (Mr. Avakov, Belorussia).
77 Id. at 84 (Mr. Cristescu, Romania).
71 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
79 Id. at410.
80 Id. at 409.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 419.
83 See id. at 420-21.
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for violations. It did not refer to an individual subject to extradition as bearing
rights of any kind. Nonetheless, Rauscher challenged the second charge, and the
U.S. Supreme Court threw out the charge, thereby giving him a remedy for the
treaty violation.84
V. A STANDARD FOR A JUDICIAL REMEDY
The International Court of Justice, in an Article 36 case brought against the
United States by Germany, stated:
[I]f the United States... should fail in its obligation of consular
notification to the detriment of German nationals, an apology
would not suffice in cases where the individuals concerned
have been subjected to prolonged detention or convicted and
sentenced to severe penalties. In the case of such a conviction
and sentence, it would be incumbent upon the United States to
allow the review and reconsideration of the conviction and
sentence by taking account of the violation of the rights set forth
in the Convention.85
In that case, two German nationals had been convicted of murder in Arizona and
sentenced to death.86 The United States admitted its violation of the obligation to
notify of the right of consular access but said that Arizona could lawfully proceed
to execute the two men.87 The United States asserted that it could remedy the
violation of its obligations to Germany by apologizing to Germany.88 The court
rejected that position.89 The court did not state whether the United States was in
violation for not having overturned the conviction or sentence, but limited itself
to stating that the United States was required to provide for "review and reconsider-
ation" in a proceeding in which it would "tak[e] account of the violation."9
' Id. at 430. See also Valerie Epps, Violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations: Time for Remedies, 11 WIMLAMErrE J. INT'L L. & DisP. RESOL. 1, 35-37 (2004)
(arguing for suppression as a remedy).
85 LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 465, 513-14 (June 27), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org.
86 Id. at 473.
87 id.
88 id.
8' Id. at 512.
9o Id. at 514.
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In Avena, the court did address the issue of an incriminating statement.91
Mexico had asked for an approach comparable to the "exclusionary rule" of U.S.
law, whereby a statement taken from a detainee who had not been informed of the
right of consular access would be inadmissible as evidence.92 The court stated that
it need not analyze the case in that way, but should confine itself to the VCCR's
requirements and to the consequences under international law of a violation.93
Referring back to LaGrand, the court reiterated that in the situation of an
incriminating statement, "review and reconsideration" must be provided to "tak[e]
account of the violation." 94 The court ruled:
The question of whether the violations of Article 36, paragraph
1, are to be regarded as having, in the causal sequence of events,
ultimately led to convictions and severe penalties is an integral
part of criminal proceedings before the courts of the United
States and is for them to determine in the process of review and
reconsideration. In so doing, it is for the courts of the United
States to examine the facts, and in particular the prejudice and
its causes, taking account of the violation of the rights set forth
in the Convention.95
The court did not further define "prejudice." It did not indicate that by "preju-
dice" it meant that the proceedings would have ended differently had consular
access been available. The Department of State has made clear that such an
approach would be unworkable and inconsistent with the VCCR.96 Arguing this
issue in Paraguay's case against the United States, the Department asserted that it
would be:
problematic to have a rule that a failure of consular notification
required a return to the status quo ante only if notification
would have led to a different outcome. It would be unworkable
for a court to attempt to determine reliably what a consular
officer would have done and whether it would have made a
difference.97
9' Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128
(Mar. 31), available at http://www.icj-cij.org.
9 Id. atpara. 126.
9' Id. at para. 127.
9' Id. at para. 131.
I ld. at para. 122.
9 Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J.
Pleadings 37 (Vienna Convention on Consular Relations) (Apr. 7, 1998).
97 id.
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The International Court of Justice did not elaborate upon the many purposes
that consular access may serve. That issue was addressed by the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights when it concluded that "[n]on-observance or impairment
of the detainee's right to information is prejudicial to the judicial guarantees."9'
The court's view was that the opportunity for consular assistance may impact
various aspects of criminal proceedings.' When a detainee has not received
consular assistance from not having been informed of the right, one can never know
what a consul might have done that would have affected the proceedings in the
foreign national's favor. Addressing the imposition of capital punishment on for-
eign nationals, which was the issue on which it was asked for an advisory opinion,
the Inter-American Court stated that the imposition of a death sentence without
compliance with the obligation to inform of the right of consular access constitutes
an arbitrary deprivation of life."°
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which operates under the
authority of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, was presented with a case
in which the issue was an incriminating statement. 1 ' Shortly after arrest, an
incriminating statement had been taken from a foreign national by authorities who
had not informed the man about consular access. The commission noted the
circumstances in which the incriminating statement had been taken.0 2 Police in
El Paso, Texas, had arranged for the detainee's mother and step-father to be
incarcerated in the town of Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, by local Mexican police, and
had used the fact of their detention to coerce a confession. 3 The commission
noted that a Texas court had concluded that the El Paso officer who testified to
not having coerced Fierro had perjured himself."°
In indicating the consequences of the failure of consular notification, the
commission focused on the confession and stated:
Mr. Fierro's confession was taken at a time when consular
notification and assistance may have been highly significant in
the circumstances. The consulate could, for example, have
9 The Right to Information, supra note 17, at para. 129.
99 See id. at paras. 119-21.
'00 Id. at para. 137.
101 Fierro v. United States, Case 11.331, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 99, OEA/ser. L./V./I. 118, doc.
5 rev. 2 (2003), available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2003engusa. 11331 .htm.
'02 Id. at para. 17.
103 id.
104 Id. at para. 18. See also Exparte Fierro, 934 S.W.2d 370, 371-72 (Tex. Crim. App.
1996) (holding that Fierro's due process rights were violated by the perjured testimony, but
denying application for writ of habeas corpus because of harmless error), cert. denied, 521
U.S. 1122 (1997).
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verified the status of Mr. Fierro' s mother and step-father, who
were being held in Mexico by the Mexican police, and thereby
mitigated any detrimental impact that their detention may have
had on Mr. Fierro's interrogation and the veracity of the
resulting confession.'
Although the commission recited these facts to show a consequence of the failure
to inform about consular access, it did not state that it need necessarily find that
the failure to inform had led to a particular negative result for the foreign national.
Unlike the Texas court, the commission held that to execute a foreign national
following a failure to comply with the notification requirement of Article 36
constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of life."° The Commission ruled that the
United States was required to give the foreign national a new trial.0 7
The U.S. Supreme Court has not fully addressed the issue of the consequence
of an Article 36 violation. In the only Article 36 case to reach the Court, the
matter was only heard on a last-minute request for a stay of execution, without full
briefing.'0 8 Rejecting the request for a stay on grounds that the applicant had not
raised the Article 36 issue in a timely manner, the Court nonetheless speculated on
the impact of an Article 36 violation."°
By way of dictum, the Court wrote that prejudice would be relevant: "it is
extremely doubtful that the violation should result in the overturning of a final
judgment of conviction without some showing that the violation had an effect on
the trial."' 0 The Court did not specify that by "effect" it meant a decisive effect.
A U.S. district court, purporting to follow this dictum, stated that the petitioner
"must show a) that his Vienna Convention rights were violated; and b) that the
violation had a material effect on the outcome of the trial or sentencing proceed-
ing."' " This court found prejudice because of the absence of consular assistance
at the mitigation phase of sentencing." 2 "Particularly in this case, where trial
counsel failed completely to undertake any investigation of the client's life, char-
acter, and background in preparation for the sentencing phase, the participation of
the Consulate could possibly have made a difference.""'
'5o Fierro, Case 11.331, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 99, at para. 39.
106 Id. at para. 41.
"07 Id. at para. 72.
108 Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (per curiam).
'09 Id. at 376-77.
I0 Id. at 377.
." United States ex rel. Madej v. Schomig, 223 F. Supp. 2d 968, 980 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
112 Id.
113 id.
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In an earlier case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals took a different
approach." 4 The court stated that while it is incumbent on a foreign national to
raise the issue, it is for the government to disprove that the failure of notification
did not prejudice the foreign national." 5 Applying the test to the case at bar, the
Ninth Circuit held:
[T]he appellant in this case carried his initial burden of going
forward with evidence that he did not know of his right to con-
sult with consular officials, that he would have availed himself
of that right had he known of it, and that there was a likelihood
that the contact would have resulted in assistance to him in
resisting deportation." 6
The court, moreover, did not require a decisive effect on the outcome of the
proceedings. Rather, prejudice would be present if the foreign national's contact
with a consul, had it occurred, "would have resulted in assistance to him," and if it
appears that the foreign national was unaware of the right of consular access and
would have requested it if informed about it." 7 A number of U.S. courts have taken
a similar approach to prejudice in the consular access context."' These courts have
stated that the evidentiary burden on the foreign national is one of production
only."
l9
This approach was taken in the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, as it
considered the case of Osbaldo Torres, one of the Mexican nationals whose right
to consular access had been found by the International Court of Justice in Avena to
have been infringed. 2° On the basis of the Avena decision, Torres, only days away
"4 United States v. Rangel-Gonzales, 617 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1980).
"15 Id. at 532.
116 Id. at 533. In 2000, the issue of prejudice became irrelevant for the Ninth Circuit
because of United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (holding
that no remedy is required for a consular access violation), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 991 (2000).
" Rangel-Gonzales, 617 F.2d at 533.
I s See, e.g., United States v. Chaparro-Alcantara, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1126 (C.D. Ill.
1999), aftd, 226 F.3d 616 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1026 (2000); United States v.
Esparza-Ponce, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1097 (S.D. Cal. 1998), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 842
(2000).
" See Esparza-Ponce, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1097 (citing United States v. Villa-Fabela, 882
F.2d 434, 440 (9th Cir. 1989) ("To establish prejudice, the defendant must produce
evidence .... )); see also State v. Cevallos Bermeo, 754 A.2d 1224, 1227-28 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App.) (applying the same three-pronged test from Villa-Fabela, 882 F.2d at 440), cert.
denied, 762 A.2d 221 (N.J. 2000).
120 Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128,
para. 153 (Mar. 31), available at http://www.icj-cij.org.
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from execution, moved the court for a stay.' 2 ' The Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals granted the stay and ordered a hearing of the kind called for in Avena:
to determine whether the Article 36 violation prejudiced Torres.'22 One judge,
specially concurring, recited specific ways in which the Article 36 violation may
have affected the trial but included that the standard for prejudice was whether the
defendant was unaware of the consular access right, whether the defendant would
have availed himself of it, and whether the consulate likely would have assisted.'23
VI. THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN COURT PRACTICE
The issue of whether to suppress a statement made by a foreign national who
was not informed of the right of consular access received detailed analysis in a pair
of 2000 U.S. Court of Appeals cases, one in the First Circuit and one in the Ninth
Circuit.'24 Each court denied suppression as a remedy. 25 In both cases the foreign
national sought suppression of a statement made shortly after arrest. 26 Neither had
been advised about consular access.' 27 The First Circuit asked the Department of
State for its views and received a letter from David Andrews, Legal Adviser of the
Department of State.12' Andrews wrote that a failure of consular notification "does
not, as such, give rise to a right to an individual remedy requiring the reversal of all
or part of a criminal proceeding."' 2 9
An accompanying document, prepared by the Department and forwarded to the
court by Andrews, stated that the courts of states that are party to the VCCR do not
suppress statements as a remedy."3
Conversely, we are aware of two jurisdictions, Italy and
Australia, in which courts have rejected requests by individuals
for a remedy in the context of a criminal proceeding of a vio-
lation of Article 36 of the VCCR. These are the Yater case,
decided in Italy in 1973, and the Abbrederis case, decided in
121 Torres v. State, No. PCD-04-442, slip op. (Okla. Crim. App. May 13, 2004) (order
granting stay of execution and remanding case for evidentiary hearing).
122 See id. at 1-2.
123 Id. at 1-12 (Chapel, J., specially concurring).
114 United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 57 (1st Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 956
(2000); United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 991 (2000).
'25 Li, 206 F.3d at 60; Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at 888.
126 Li, 206 F.3d at 59; Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at 884.
127 Li, 206 F.3d at 59; Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at 884.
8 Andrews Letter, supra note 12.
129 Id. at 2.
130 Id. at A-9.
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Australia in 1981. Copies of reports of both decisions have
been provided to the Department of Justice.' 3 '
As it concluded that no judicial remedy is required for an Article 36 violation,
and specifically no suppression, the court cited the Department's reference to the
practice of foreign courts, though not specifically to the Italian or Australian
cases.' 32 The court cited Supreme Court statements on the weight of Department
views: "Respect is ordinarily due the reasonable views of the Executive Branch
concerning the meaning of an international treaty."'3 3 Further, "[a]lthough not
conclusive, the meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the Government agencies
charged with their negotiation and enforcement is entitled to great weight." '134
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered the same issue at
the same time as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. 3 s In the Ninth
Circuit case, a foreign national sought suppression of a pre-trial statement on the
grounds that he had not been informed about consular access. After the district
court denied suppression, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed and
remanded, ruling that a post-arrest statement made by a foreign national who
had not been informed about consular access should be suppressed, so long as the
failure to inform caused prejudice.'36 The court then agreed to hear the case en
banc. 137
At that stage, U.S. Attorney David Kris filed Government's Supplemental En
Banc Brief, in which he recited that he was providing the court a copy of the Legal
Adviser's letter that had been submitted to the First Circuit in Li.' In the brief,
Kris specifically referenced the State Department's Answers and its treatment of
the Yater and Abbrederis cases: "Courts in two countries, Italy and Australia, have
specifically rejected claims for a remedy resulting from failures of consular
notification in criminal cases. Letter A-8 (discussing Re Yater, 77 I.L.R. 541 (Italy,
Court of Cassation 1973), and R. v. Abbrederis, 36 Australia Law Reports 109(CCA NSW 198 1)." "39
131 id.
132 Li, 206 F.3d at 65-66.
133 Id. at 63 (citing El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 168
(1999)).
I' Id. (citing Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982)).
'35 United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2000).
136 United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 170 F.3d 1241, 12-44 (9th Cir. 1999).
'31 United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 188 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 1999).
138 Government's Supplemental En Banc Brief at 27, Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882
(9th Cir. 2000) (Nos. 98-50347, 98-50305).
,39 Id. In Italy, the Court of Cassation is the country's highest court. The Australian case,
as the "CCA NSW" citation indicates, was decided by the Court of Criminal Appeal in the
Australian state of New South Wales, the court of last resort in criminal matters in New
South Wales.
[Vol. 13:339
2004] SUPPRESSING THE INCRIMINATING STATEMENTS OF FOREIGNERS 357
In its en banc decision in Lombera-Camorlinga, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed the panel decision.' 4 The en banc court placed great reliance
on the Department of State's letter, which had not been available to the panel.
"While the panel," the court stated, "was provided with 'scant authority' on this
issue, the State Department has now spoken, and has expressed its opinion that
suppression is an inappropriate remedy."'1
4 1
As a centerpiece in its analysis, the court related the State Department's
account of foreign court decisions, as reflected in the Department's answer to the
First Circuit:
The State Department also points out that no other sig-
natories to the Vienna Convention have permitted suppression
under similar circumstances, and that two (Italy and Australia)
have specifically rejected it. In the Australian decision, R v.
Abbrederis, (1981) 36 A.L.R. 109, the court concluded as we
do today that the Vienna Convention's Article 36 protections
neither target police interrogation nor seek to prevent self-
incrimination or preserve the right to counsel. The opinion
stated: "Even giving the fullest weight to the prescriptions in
Art 36, I do not see how it can be contended that they in any
way affect the carrying out of an investigation by interrogation."
By refusing to adopt an exclusionary rule, we thus promote
harmony in the interpretation of an international agreement.4
Counsel for the foreign nationals in the two cases did not challenge the
relevance of either the Australian or the Italian decision. The arrest and conviction
of a foreign national was involved in both the Australian and the Italian case.
However, in neither case did the court decline to suppress a post-arrest statement
on the grounds that Article 36 does not call for a judicial remedy.
The quotation given by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, from
the Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales, gives the appearance that the
Australian court denied suppression as a remedy for an incriminating statement
made by a foreign national under interrogation, where the foreign national was not
informed about consular access.'43 That was not so, however. The colloquy in
question took place at the Sydney International Airport.'" Australian customs
'40 Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882.
141 Id. at 887 (citations omitted).
142 Id. at 888.
143 Id.
44 R. v. Abbrederis (1981) 36 A.L.R. 109, 110-11.
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agents searched the luggage of an Austrian arriving on an international flight.145
After the agents found a substance appearing to be heroin, the Austrian made self-
incriminating statements.'6 Following conviction, the Austrian appealed,
challenging the admission into evidence of his statements on the basis that the
customs agent had not informed him of a right of access to an Austrian consul. The
Court of Criminal Appeal rejected the challenge."'
The court did not, however, state that it rejected a remedy for an Article 36
violation. The court was quoted incorrectly by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals."' The latter court omitted a critical portion of the sentence as written by
the Australian court. The full sentence, and the full paragraph, read:
The objection [by the defendant to the admission of his
statement], in my view, has no merit. Even giving the fullest
weight to the prescriptions in Art 36, I do not see how it can
be contended that they in any way affect the carrying out of
an investigation by interrogation of a foreign person coming
to this country. The article is dealing with freedom of commu-
nication between consuls and their nationals. It says nothing
touching upon the ordinary process of an investigation by way
of interrogation. In my view this ground of appeal is not made
good. 1
49
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals omitted the final eight words of the
sentence it quoted. 5° Those eight words make clear that the rationale of the Court
of Criminal Appeal was that Article 36 did not apply because of the type of
questioning involved. In that court's view, Article 36 does not come into play in
customs questioning at a border. The issue of what type of custody gives rise to a
right to be informed about consular access is not handled with precision in Article
36 of the VCCR. Whether or not the Australian court was correct in its view that
the airport questioning did not qualify, its decision was based on that issue. The
court expressed no opinion about whether an interrogation involved a right to be
notified about consular access.
The Yater case involved a British national convicted of criminal offenses in
Italy, who challenged the conviction by invoking Article 36 of the VCCR, along
with an article of an Italy-UK bilateral consular treaty.' The case report does not
145 id.
146 Id. at 111.
'4 id. at 123.
'4 See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
'49 36 A.L.R. at 123.
IS' Those eight words are "of a foreign person coming to this country." Id.
151 Cass., sez. un., 19 feb. 1973, Giur. It. 1974, II, 464, translated in Re Yater, 77 I.L.R.
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indicate that the British national was interrogated or that he sought to suppress an
incriminating statement. In its account of Article 36, the Court of Cassation made
no mention of the fact that Article 36 requires the detaining authorities to inform a
foreign national about consular access. Rather, the court asked whether there was
a violation of either the bilateral treaty or of Article 36 because of the failure to
notify a British consul.5 2 The court did not indicate whether the foreign national
was informed about consular access.
The attorney representing Yater may have misunderstood consular access and
argued that the failure was in not notifying a consul, whereas he perhaps should
have argued that the failure was in not notifying Yater of his right to contact consul.
In any event, the Court of Cassation seems to have thought that the obligation was
to inform a consulate, rather than, as provided under Article 36, to inform the for-
eign national." 3
Moreover, the Court of Cassation focused on whether, as a result of non-
notification of a British consul, Yater had been deprived of the right to legal
representation, because a consul may assist in securing a lawyer. However, the
court indicated that the accused has a right to secure counsel on his own, and if
he does, he has no reason to complain that his consulate was not notified.5 4 In
a final sentence omitted from the English translation used by the Department of
State, the court stated, "in this case, Yater was assisted in the renvoi proceedings
by the Attorney Manlio Cicatelli, chosen by [Yater] as defense counsel, who then
was replaced by Attorney Candotti; therefore, defensive assistance was secured
under the procedural norms in force.""'
If the Court of Cassation was implying that consular access is unnecessary
when the foreign national is represented by counsel, it misunderstood Article 36.
The fact that the foreign national has a lawyer, even a competent lawyer, does not
allow the host state to avoid the obligations of Article 36.16
The apparent confusion in the court's understanding of consular access and
the lack of any mention of an interrogation deprive the decision of relevance to
the issue before the American courts. The Court of Cassation rejected the Article
36 claim, but its decision gives little indication of the underlying facts. Most
541 (Italy, Court of Cassation 1973). The translation is the version cited by the State
Department.
152 id.
153 Id.
i54 Id. at 466.
155 Id. (translation by author).
156 Cf LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. Oral Pleadings, 14.5 (Nov. 17, 2000),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocketligus/igusframe.htm. The United States
argued that criminal prosecution need not "be reopened simply because a consular officer did
not have a chance to arrange counsel for someone who in fact was represented by counsel."
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importantly, the court, in discussing Article 36, never mentioned the obligation to
inform the foreign national. Contrary to the representation in the Department of
State's Answers, the decision provides no support for the position that judicial
remedies, and in particular suppression of a statement, are not required when Article
36 has been violated.
157
In the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, three judges
dissented, finding that suppression is an appropriate remedy.'58 The dissenters
felt it necessary to respond to the majority's reliance on the Department of State's
reference to the Italian and Australian cases. Not realizing that the cases were
inapposite, the dissenters were forced to dismiss them on statistical grounds: "That
two of the more than 161 signatory countries have concluded that the Vienna
Convention's Article 36 protections 'neither target police interrogation nor seek to
prevent self-incrimination or preserve the right to counsel,' hardly dictates how the
treaty provisions should be enforced in the United States."' 59
The dissenters, doubtless, are correct that even if the courts in two states
party to the VCCR held as the State Department claimed, that fact would not be
dispositive on how the Convention must be applied. Nonetheless, it is unfortunate
that the dissenters were forced to explain away the Italian and Australian cases.
Two other circuits of the U.S. Court of Appeals have repeated the error of the
First and Ninth Circuits by referring to the Department's citation of the Australian
and Italian cases.16 Rejecting an Article 36 claim in United States v. Page, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit quoted Lombera-Camorlinga: "Furthermore,
'no other signatories to the Vienna Convention have permitted suppression under
similar circumstances, and.., two (Italy and Australia) have specifically rejected
it." 16 ' The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, rejecting an Article 36
claim, stated that "no party to the Vienna Convention has dismissed a criminal
charge based on a violation of Article 36.''l62 Continuing, the court cited both Page
and Lombera-Camorlinga to state, "[i]ndeed, two parties, Italy and Australia, have
specifically rejected that possibility." 63
7 Giur. It. 1974, II, 464, 466.
I58 Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at 890 (Boochever, J., dissenting).
'59 id. at 888-89 (citations omitted).
"6 See United States v. Page, 232 F.3d 536, 541 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S.
1056 (2001) (quoting Li, 206 F.3d at 63, and Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at 888, and
concluding that the "remedies of suppression of evidence and dismissal of the indictment are
not available under the Vienna Convention"); United States v. Duarte-Acero, 296 F.3d 1277,
1282 (1 1th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1038 (2002) (noting that both Italy and Australia
have rejected dismissing a criminal charge because of an Article 36 violation).
161 Page, 232 F.3d at 541 (quoting Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at 888).
162 Duarte-Acero, 296 F.3d at 1282.
113 Id. (citing Page, 232 F.3d at 541, and Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at 888).
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First Circuit Judge Torruella, who dissented in Li, noted that while courts
give weight to State Department views, determining the meaning of treaties when
relevant to litigation is the constitutionally mandated role of the courts."6 "We
are no longer merely considering international agreements to be administered or
enforced at the discretion of the State Department, in which its interpretation as to
applicability is entitled to special expertise or deference," he wrote. 6 The VCCR,
after being ratified, he stated, "became the municipal law of the United States
pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, and its provisions enforceable in the courts
of the United States at the behest of affected individuals without the need for
additional legislative action."'" Judge Torruella apparently did not realize that
the views of the State Department were based on two mis-cited cases, but he
appropriately discounted the State Department's view.167
Given the Department's views on the VCCR, Judge Torruella's reminder
about the Supremacy Clause should be heeded by other courts. It is their role to
read a treaty. The VCCR, fairly construed, provides rights invocable by foreign
nationals. It requires a remedy in case of violation, and in particular, it does not
allow the admission into evidence of an incriminating statement made before the
foreign national was advised of the right of consular access.'6 8
The United States again used the Abbrederis and Yater cases, despite their
irrelevance, in its Counter-Memorial against Mexico in the International Court of
Justice.'69 It cited them for the proposition that observance of Article 36 rights is
not fundamental to due process and hence, no remedy is required. 7 °
CONCLUSION
The fact that the International Court of Justice has held that a VCCR violation
must be judicially remedied adds a new element of obligation for the United States
and for its courts.' 7 ' The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
stated that the ruling of the International Court of Justice in LaGrand, that
procedural default rules may not be used to evade an Article 36 claim, "conclu-
sively determines that Article 36 of the Vienna Convention creates individually
enforceable rights, resolving the question most American courts . . . have left
64 Li, 206 F.3d at 69-70 (Toruella, J., dissenting).
165 Id. at 69.
166 Id. at 69-70.
167 Id.
168 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 1, at art. 36.
169 Counter-Memorial of the United States of America (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J.
Pleadings (Nov. 3, 2003), available at http://www.icj-cij.org.
170 Id. at 135-36.
17' See LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 465 (June 27).
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open.' '172 The concurring judge in the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals wrote
that his court was required to comply with the Avena ruling.
73
Under the UN Charter, a treaty ratified by the United States, a state that is a
party to litigation in the International Court of Justice must comply with the court's
judgment.' Recourse to the UN Security Council is available against a state that
fails to comply.'75 Thus, the U.S. obligation to provide a remedy for an Article 36
violation rests not only on the VCCR itself, but on the court's interpretation of it.
The securing of an incriminating statement soon after arrest is one of the most
flagrant consequences of an Article 36 violation. The rights of both the sending
state and the individual detainee are implicated. The courts should be clear that
a judicial remedy is required when Article 36 is violated, and that a statement
taken in violation of Article 36 is presumptively inadmissible as evidence. In
considering these cases, the courts should not automatically accept the views of
the Department of State. In particular, they should scrutinize court decisions cited
by the State Department.
172 United States ex rel. Madej v. Schomig, 223 F. Supp. 2d 968, 979 (N.D. I11. 2002)
(citing LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 494).
17' Torres v. State, No. PCD-04-442, slip op. at 5 (Okla. Crim. App. May 13, 2004)
(Chapel, J. concurring).
'4 U.N. CHARTER art. 94, para. 1.
175 Id. at art. 94, para. 2.
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